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FIRST GALESBURG NATIONAL BANK & TRUST
CO. v. JOANNIDES: A DEBTOR'S RIGHT IN
REPOSSESSED COLLATERAL STRIPPED
WITHOUT NOTICE*
Section 9-504(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code requires secured parties to notify debtors of post-default sales of collateral.1
Despite the seemingly clear language of this section, Illinois courts
have disagreed on its proper application. 2 The conflict centers on
* 103 Ill. 2d 294, 469 N.E.2d 180 (1984).
1. All references to the Uniform Commercial Code pertain to the Code as
adopted by Illinois. Section 9-504(3), the notice provision, is incorporated into chapter 26 of the Illinois Revised Statutes. Section 9-504(3) provides:
Dispositions of collateral may be by public or private proceedings and may be
made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or other disposition may be as a
unit or in parcels and . . . must be commercially reasonable. Unless collateral
is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place
of any public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which any private
sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured
party to the debtor, if he has not signed after default a statement renouncing
or modifying his right to notification of the sale.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, §9-504(3) (1983).
The Code defines a "secured party" as a "lender, seller or other person in whose
favor there is a security interest, including a person to whom accounts or chattel
paper have been sold." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, §9-105(1)(m) (1983).
"Security interest" means "an interest in personal property or fixtures which
secures payment or performance of an obligation.
... ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, §1201(33) (1983).
Under the Code, "debtor" is defined as:
[Tihe person who owes payment or other performance of the obligation secured, whether or not he owns or has rights in the collateral, and includes the
seller of accounts or chattel paper. Where the debtor and the owner of the
collateral are not the same person, the term 'debtor' means the owner of the
collateral in any provision of the code dealing with the collateral, the obligor in
any provision dealing with the obligation, and may include both where the context so requires.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, §9-105(1)(d) (1983).
2. Courts have applied two diametrically opposed interpretations of section 9504(3). One line of decisions espouses the absolute bar theory. See, e.g., Staley Employee Credit Union v. Christie, 111 Ill. App. 3d 165, 443 N.E.2d 731 (1982) (absolute
bar theory applied where the creditor notified the debtor of pending public sale but
subsequently sold the collateral at a private sale without giving the debtor additional
notice); State Nat'l Bank of Evanston v. Northwest Dodge, 108 Ill. App. 3d 376, 438
N.E.2d 1345 (1982) (absolute bar theory applied where the bank repossessed collateral from the automobile dealer and sold the collateral without notice); Spillers v.
First Nat'l Bank of Arenzville, 81 Ill. App. 3d 199, 400 N.E.2d 1057 (1980) (absolute
bar theory applied where creditor received a bid for the repossessed collateral and
notified the debtor of the impending sale, but did not allow the debtor to respond to
the bid price). The appellate court of the Joannides litigation also applied the abso-
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whether the failure of a secured party to give notice to the debtor
before disposing of collateral bars the secured party from recovering
a deficiency judgment against the debtor.3 This conflict was resolved
4
In
in First Galesburg National Bank & Trust Co. v. Joannides.
Joannides, the Illinois Supreme Court held that when collateral is
sold without prior notice to the debtor, the value of the collateral
sold is presumed to equal the amount of the indebtedness.' If a secured party successfully rebuts this presumption, he is entitled to
recover a deficiency judgment.'
The circumstances which gave rise to the Joannides litigation
are typical of many circumstances involving secured transactions.'
lute bar theory. For a discussion of the appellate court's treatment of the absolute bar
theory, see infra note 15.
The other interpretation of Section 9-504(3) is the rebuttable presumption theory, adopted by the Joannides court. See, e.g., National Boulevard Bank v. Jackson,
92 Ill. App. 3d 928, 416 N.E.2d 358 (1981) (rebuttable presumption theory applied
where the secured party notified the debtor of a public sale of collateral but subsequently sold the collateral at a private sale because no bidders appeared); A.A. Store
Fixture Co. v. Kouzoukas, 87 Ill. App. 3d 631, 410 N.E.2d 131 (1980) (rebuttable presumption theory applied where the secured party claimed that he notified the debtor
but failed to introduce any evidence substantiating the claim).
The absolute bar theory attempts to balance the relative control of the parties in
a typical secured transaction. Wilmington Trust v. Conner, 415 A.2d 773 (Del. Supr.
1980). The secured creditor, who already enjoys a high degree of control, must give
notice in order to collect a deficiency judgment. Id. at 780. The rebuttable presumption theory, on the other hand, attempts to avoid the arbitrary punishment of secured
creditor. Joannides,103 Ill. 2d at 298, 469 N.E.2d at 181. The court theorizes that the
secured creditor should obtain the deficiency if a fair value was obtained for the collateral. Id. at 300-01, 469 N.E.2d at 183.
There is a geographical correlation between the theory adopted and the location
of the court. With the exception of Northwest Dodge, 108 Ill. App. 3d at 376, 438
N.E.2d at 1345, all of the absolute bar cases were decided in either the third or fourth
district. The rebuttable presumption decisions, on the other hand, are the product of
the first district. Because Chicago's large financial institutions are located in the first
district and the third and fourth districts contain less urban areas, it is possible that
the rebuttable presumption decisions are the product of court's sympathy to creditors. Conversely, the absolute bar decisions may be the product of courts being sympathetic to debtors.
3. First Galesburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Joannides, 103 Ill. 2d 294, 469
N.E.2d 180 (1984).
4. 103 Ill. 2d 294, 469 N.E.2d 180 (1984).
5. Id. at 300-01, 469 N.E.2d at 183.
6. Id. The secured party may rebut the presumption by proving that the value
of the collateral sold was less than the value of the indebtedness and that the sale was
commercially reasonable. Id.
7. The typical scenario which gives rise to this type of litigation consists of a
very simple fact pattern. The secured party makes either a sale or a loan to the
debtor and retains a security interest in some property of the debtor. The debtor
defaults on payments, and the secured party repossesses the collateral. The secured
party sells the collateral without first notifying the debtor and then brings an action
for a deficiency judgment. The debtor denies liability relying on the absolute bar theory, while the secured party relies on the rebuttable presumption theory and demands a deficiency judgment. Other jurisdictions have split on which theory they
should apply. Compare Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d 999, 104 Cal. Rptr.
315 (1972) (applying the absolute bar theory) with Norton v. National Bank of Com-
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The defendants' son entered into a floor plan financing agreement
with the plaintiff-bank.8 Collateral for the loan consisted of the automobile dealership inventory and a $50,000 guaranty by the defendants, the debtor's parents.9 After the defendants' son defaulted on
the loan payments,10 the bank liquidated the inventory and subsequently notified the defendants that they would have to honor their
guaranty because the sale of the collateral resulted in a deficiency.
The defendants refused to honor their guaranty contending that the
bank had not complied with statutory notice requirements.' 2 In an
attempt to collect the $50,000, the bank brought an action on the
guaranty.'3 Following adverse decisions in both the trial 4 and appelmerce, 240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966) (applying the rebuttable presumption
theory). For a definition of the absolute bar theory, see infra note 22 and accompanying text.
8. Under a floor plan financing agreement, an automobile dealer who has purchased automobiles executes a note to the lender for the amount of the purchase. The
lender loans the amount and retains a security interest in the autos. After the dealer
sells the autos, he repays the amount of the note to the lender, and the security
interest is extinguished. See, e.g., Harlan v. United States, 312 F.2d 402 (Ct. Cl.
1963); Volusia Discount Co. v. Alexander K-F Motors, 88 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 1956);
G.F.C. Corp. v. Nesser, 273 S.W.2d 264 (Mo. 1954).
9. The dealership, Town and Country Dodge, was in poor financial condition in
the late 1970's and the plaintiff bank requested that Joannides seek financing elsewhere. In order to calm the plaintiff bank's reservations, the debtor's parents agreed
to guarantee the financing agreement for $50,000. The plaintiff bank acquiesced and
continued its relationship with the dealership. Joannides, 103 Ill. 2d at 296, 469
N.E.2d at 180-81.
10. Id. The plaintiff bank learned that 32 cars had been sold without repayment
to the bank. The plaintiff bank promptly took control of Town and Country and
closed it. Tim Joannides, the debtor, was subsequently convicted in criminal court for
converting the plaintiff bank's collateral. Appellant's Reply Brief at 8, First Galesburg Nat'l Bank v. Joannides, 103 Ill. 2d 294, 469 N.E.2d 180 (1984).
11. The plaintiff bank sent the following letter to the guarantors after the collateral had been sold:
On Friday, May 8, 1981, the doors of Town and Country Dodge were
closed to the public and subsequent to that the business has been placed in
bankruptcy.
The intent of this letter is to notify you that it now appears a loss will be
realized and the bank will be forced to ask you to honor your guarantee of
$50,000 dated February 19, 1980.
We are available at your convenience to discuss this situation if you have
questions.
Joannides, 103 Ill. 2d at 296-97, 469 N.E.2d at 181.
12. Id. The defendants relied on the absolute bar theory, which was formerly
applied in the district where the dispute arose. Id. For a discussion of the geographical correlation between the judicial district and the application of the notice provision, see supra note 2.
13. Joannides, 103 Ill. 2d at 297, 469 N.E.2d at 181. The Joannides, as guarantors, were considered parties to whom notice must have been given pursuant to section 9-504(3), the notice provision. It is uniformly held that guarantors fall within the
class of persons to whom section 9-504(3) notice must be given. Commercial Discount
Corp. v. Bayer, 57 Ill. App. 3d 295, 372 N.E.2d 926 (1978); see also Zions First Nat'l
Bank v. Hurst, 570 P.2d 1031 (Utah 1977) (section 1-105, which defines persons to
whom notice must be given, includes guarantors).
14. At trial, the Joannides contended not only that the plaintiff-bank failed to
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late courts, 15 the bank appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court. 6
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court confronted the issue of
whether the bank's failure to give notice17 to the defendants before
disposing of the inventory barred the bank from recovering a deficiency judgment.'8 The court adopted the rebuttable presumption
theory and held that because the bank had sold the collateral without first notifying the defendants, the value of the collateral sold
was presumed to equal the value of the defendants' son's indebtedness.' 9 The court remanded the case to allow the bank an opportunity to rebut the presumption 0 and stated that the bank may rebut
notify them but also that the plaintiff-bank did not dispose of the inventory in a
commercially reasonable manner. The trial judge ruled that commercial reasonableness is a question of fact and is therefore properly delegated to the jury. The jury
found that the sale was not commercially reasonable, and the court entered judgment
on that finding alone. Joannides, 103 Ill. 2d at 297, 469 N.E.2d at 181.
Section 9-504(3), the notice provision, also requires that all sales be commercially
reasonable. For the complete text of section 9-504(3) see supra note 1. The sale of
repossessed collateral has been considered commercially reasonable in numerous
cases. See, e.g., Conti-Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382, 276 A.2d 402
(1971), aff'd, 118 N.J. Super. 521, 288 A.2d 872 (1972) (sale was commercially reasonable where the fair market value was obtained, even though the secured party was the
only one at the sale); Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87 (Alaska 1969) (the
collateral was appraised and sold at appraisal price). The sale of collateral has not
been considered commercially reasonable in several cases. Leasing Associates v.
Slaughter & Son, Inc., 450 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1971) (no evidence concerning sale was
introduced); Farmer's Equip. Co. v. Miller, 252 Ark. 1092, 482 S.W.2d 805 (1972) (a
prolonged length of time between repossession and sale coupled with the failure to
pursue parties genuinely interested in the collateral). In most cases involving lack of
notice, the issue of commercial reasonableness is also raised. See generally Annot., 59
A.L.R. 3d (1974) (deals with a comprehensive examination of the commercial reasonableness issue).
15. Joannides,103 Ill. 2d at 297, 469 N.E.2d at 181. The appellate court did not
affirm the trial court decision on the basis of commercial reasonableness. Instead, the
appellate court applied the absolute bar theory and ruled that the plaintiff bank was
barred from a deficiency judgment because the plaintiff bank had failed to notify the
debtors of the sale of collateral. Id.
16. Joannides, 103 Ill. 2d at 297, 469 N.E.2d at 181.
17. "Notice" is defined in section 1-201(26), which provides that a "person 'notifies' or 'gives' notice or notification to another by taking such steps as may be reasonably required to inform the other in ordinary course whether or not such other
actually comes to know of it." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, §1-201(26) (1983).
18. First Galesburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Joannides, 103 Ill. 2d 294, 469
N.E.2d 180 (1984).
19. Id.
20. Id. There exists some controversy concerning the secured party's ability to
rebut the presumption. At least one writer has commented that the rebuttable presumption theory may result in the denial of deficiency judgments in the majority of
cases. White, Representing the Low-Income Consumer in Repossessions, Resales and
Deficiency Judgment Cases, 3 U.C.C. L.J. 199, 224 (1970-71). The writer cites Barker
v. Horn, 245 Ark. 315, 432 S.W.2d 21 (1968) to support the proposition that the presumption may be impossible to rebut. In Barker, the Arkansas court adopted the
rebuttable presumption theory but dismissed the case without allowing the secured
party an opportunity to rebut the presumption. Id. The Barker court discounted the
plaintiff's ability to prove that the price obtained was an adequate amount. The
writer's theory can be criticized, however, as many cases exist where the presumption
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the presumption by proving both that the value of the collateral sold
was less than the value of the indebtedness and that the sale was
commercially reasonable.2
In reaching its conclusion, the court rejected the absolute bar
theory. This theory states that a secured party is absolutely barred
from a deficiency judgment if he disposes of collateral without first
notifying the debtor.2 2 The court initially examined the notice provision of the Uniform Commercial Code and indicated that it does not
explicitly state that lack of notice bars a deficiency judgment."
Next, the court examined the debtor's rights and remedies provision
of article nine and reasoned that a debtor has a right to recover any
loss resulting from the secured party's failure to comply with the
notice provision.2 4 The court held that this protection is sufficient
and, therefore, that an absolute bar is unnecessary. 2' The court concluded that the combination of the absence of absolute bar language
from the notice provision and the presence of a debtor's cause of
was successfully rebutted. See, e.g., Conti-Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super.
382, 276 A.2d 402 (1971), aff'd, 118 N.J. Super. 521, 288 A.2d 872 (1972) (the fair
value of the goods was established through the bluebook value of the car); United
States v. Whitehouse Plastics, Inc., 501 F.2d 692, 696 (5th Cir. 1974) (an appraisal
made by an expert of 12 years experience was considered representative of the fair
value of the collateral), cert. denied sub nom Baker v. United States, 421 U.S. 912
(1975); Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87 (Alaska 1969) (an expert's appraisal of the value of collateral held sufficient to rebut the presumption). For a discussion of the secured party's ability to rebut the presumption, see Note, Secured
Transactions - New Jersey Upholds the Right of a Secured Party to Collect a Deficiency Judgment Under U.C.C. 9-504(2) Although Notice Provisions Were Not Observed, 76 DICK. L. REV. 394, 398 (1971).
21. Id.
22. Joannides, 103 Ill. 2d at 299-300, 469 N.E.2d at 182.
23. Joannides, 103 111.2d at 300-01, 469 N.E.2d at 182. Although the court reasoned that the absolute bar theory is not mandated by the language of the Code, it
did not rest its decision solely on the absence of such language. Instead, the court
examined the absence of absolute bar language in conjunction with section 9-507(1),
the debtor's rights and remedies provision. Id. at 299-300, 469 N.E.2d at 182. For a
discussion of section 9-507(1), see infra note 24 and accompanying text.
24. Joannides, 103 Ill. 2d at 300, 469 N.E.2d at 182. The debtor's rights and
remedies provision, section 9-507(1), provides:
If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in accordance with
the provisions of this part disposition may be ordered or restrained on appropriate terms and conditions. If the disposition has occurred the debtor or any
person entitled to notification or whose security interest has been made known
to the secured party prior to the disposition has a right to recover from the
secured party any loss caused by a failure to comply with the provisions of this
party.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, §9-507(1) (1983).
25. Joannides, 103 Ill. 2d at 300, 469 N.E.2d at 182. Many of the cases which
support the rebuttable presumption theory state that section 9-507(1) is sufficient to
protect the debtor from losses caused by lack of notice. See, e.g., Barker v. Horn, 245
Ark. 315, 432 S.W.2d 21 (1968) (section 9-507(1) precludes an absolute bar because
damages recoverable can be asserted by way of a set-off or counterclaim); Norton v.
National Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966) (section 9-507(1)
gives rise to a presumption that collateral is worth the amount of the debt).
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action in the rights and remedies provision militates against adopt26
ing the absolute bar theory.
In adopting the rebuttable presumption theory, the court also
noted that article nine is intended to avoid penal results.17 The
court reasoned that an absolute bar of a deficiency judgment shields
the debtor from a deficiency judgment even when lack of notice has
not damaged the debtor.2 s This grants the debtor a windfall and arbitrarily penalizes the secured party.2 9 The court decided that the
rebuttable presumption theory comports with the intent of the Code
to avoid arbitrary penalization of the secured party.30 Requiring the
secured party to prove both that the value of the collateral sold was
less than the value of the indebtedness and that the sale was commercially reasonable removes the possibility that the secured party
will be arbitrarily penalized."
Analysis of the court's reasoning must include an examination
of pre-Code law."2 Section 1-103 of the Code allows principles of
26. Joannides, 103 Ill. 2d at 299-300, 469 N.E.2d at 182.
27. Id. at 300-01, 469 N.E.2d at 182-83. The court refers to section 1-106(1), the
specific intent provision, which provides in pertinent part:
The remedies provided by this act shall be liberally administered to the
end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other
party had fully performed but neither consequential or special nor penal damages may be had except as specifically provided in this Act or by other rule of
law.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, §1-106(1) (1983).
28. Joannides 103 Ill. 2d at 300-01, 469 N.E.2d at 182-83. The court noted, for
example, that the Joannides did not intend to attend the sale or to redeem the collateral. The absolute bar theory, reasoned the court, deprives the secured party of an
opportunity to obtain a deficiency judgment even if the goods were sold at a fair
price. Id.
29. Id. The court stated that the secured party should be in as good a position
as if the debtor had not defaulted. Id. If the debtor had fully performed, the secured
party would receive the full contract amount. But when the debtor defaults and sale
of collateral results in a deficiency, preventing a deficiency judgment deprives the
secured party of an amount to which he was entitled. Id.
30. Joannides, 103 Ill. 2d at 300-01, 469 N.E.2d at 182-83.
31. Id. The court also pointed out that the rebuttable presumption theory
leaves the debtor's rights and remedies intact. Id. For instance, even if a secured
party rebuts the presumption and recovers a deficiency judgment, the debtor may
still set-off any damages resulting from lack of notice. Id. at 301, 469 N.E.2d at 183.
The existence of the debtor's set-off is an adequate deterrent to the improper disposition of collateral, according to the court. Id. Finally, the court intimated that its decision is consistent with the decisions in most other jurisdictions and supplied a list of
rebuttable presumption decisions. For a list of rebuttable presumption decisions, see
Joannides, 103 Ill. 2d at 301, 469 N.E.2d at 183.
32. Before the court's analysis is addressed, a preliminary examination of the
justifications for the rebuttal presumption theory and a discussion of several other
hybrid solutions to the notice issue are in order. The underlying justification for the
rebuttable presumption theory is that the secured party should be allowed to collect a
deficiency judgment when he can establish the fair value of the collateral. Kobuk
Engineering & Contracting Services, Inc. v. Superior Tank Co., 568 P.2d 1007 (Alaska
1977). The courts also frequently cite the debtor's rights and remedies provision, section 9-507(1), and hold that the debtor already enjoys a remedy sufficient to protect
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pre-Code law and equity to supplement the Code unless displaced
by a provision's express language."3 Pre-Code law strictly enforced
the secured party's duty to inform the debtor of post-default 4 sales
and denied deficiency judgments to secured parties that had not
complied with the notice requirements.3 5 The Joannides court
the debtor against losses resulting from lack of notice. Barbour v. United States, 562
F.2d 19 (10th Cir. 1977). For a discussion of the Joannides court's application of this
justification, see supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
fatal weakness of the reliance on section 9-507(1), see infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
Variations of the rebuttable presumption theory and the absolute bar theory exist. For example, one line of cases holds that lack of notice does not bar a deficiency
judgment but at the same time does not create a presumption that the value of the
collateral is equal to the amount of indebtedness. Instead, the debtor is required to
rely solely on section 9-507(1) damages for any loss resulting from lack of notice.
Leasco Computer, Inc. v. Sheridan Indus., 82 Misc. 2d 897, 371 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1975).
In Leasco, the secured party leased a computer to the debtor for several years. When
the debtor defaulted, the secured party repossessed and sold the computer without
first notifying the debtor. Although the sale price was grossly unfair, the trial court
did not bar the deficiency judgment. Instead, the court placed the burden on the
debtor to prove that he had sustained damages resulting from lack of notice. Id. The
debtor was forced to rely solely on section 9-507(1). Id. at 901, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 535.
See also Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 6 Wash. App. 866, 496 P.2d 966 (1972)
(debtor who does not receive notice of sale of repossessed collateral is restricted to
section 9-507 set-off damages).
A variation of the absolute bar theory exists as well. Under one line of cases, the
secured party is not only absolutely barred from a deficiency judgment but the debtor
may also recover section 9-507(1) damages. See, e.g., Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit
Corp., 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964). In Skeels, the secured party repossessed collateral
and sold it without notifying the debtor. Id. When the secured party sought a deficiency judgment, the court not only denied the deficiency judgment but also granted
the debtor compensatory damages for business losses resulting from the lack of notice. Id. See also White, Representing the Low-Income Consumer in Repossessions,
Resales and Deficiency Judgments, 3 U.C.C. L.J. 199, 225 (1970-71) (examples of

cases in which the deficiency action was barred and debtor also received damages).
33. Section 1-103 of the Code provides:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law
and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion,
mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement
its provisions.

ch. 26, §1-103 (1983).
34. What constitutes "default" is not defined in the Code but is left to the parties themselves. Borochoff Properties, Inc. v. Howard Lumber Co., 115 Ga. App. 691,
ILL. REV. STAT.

696, 155 S.E.2d 651, 654 (1967). See also Lakin, Default Proceedings Under Article 9:
Problems, Solutions, and Lessons to be Learned, 8 AKRON L. REV. 1, 2 (1975) (in-

cludes discussion and examples of when default occurs as per the parties' agreement).
35. This was true in cases ranging from early common law to pre-Code statutory
law. At early common law, the secured party (then called a pledgee) retained the
collateral until the debtor's (the pledgor's) obligation was extinguished. This was the
common law mechanism for preventing the debtor from obtaining multiple financing
on the same chattel. If the debtor defaulted, the secured party had the right to sell
the collateral and maintain a deficiency action if necessary. The secured party was
absolutely required to notify the debtor of the sale in order to obtain a deficiency
judgment. The courts reasoned that title did not pass from the debtor to the secured
party and that the secured party could not dispose of the collateral without the
debtor's knowledge. The rule was established at common law to allow the debtor an
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stated, however, that the absolute bar theory should not be applied
because it is not explicitly provided for in the notice provision. 6
The court also rejected the absolute bar theory because the debtor's
rights and remedies provision already provides the debtor with sufficient remedies, which do not include an absolute bar.37 The court
erred in relying on these factors. The court should have focused on
the fact that neither the notice provision nor the debtor's rights and
remedies provision expressly displaces the absolute bar theory." An
examination of pre-Code law, which should complement the Code,
reveals that the court erred in rejecting the absolute bar theory.
The court not only neglected pre-Code law but also failed to
examine the Code as a whole. The court overlooked the general intent provision (section 1-102), which states that the purpose of the
Code is to simplify and clarify commercial law and to permit the
continued expansion of commercial practices through agreement of
the parties.3 ' Instead, the court relied on the specific intent provision (section 1-106), which states that penal results should be
avoided.40 The court afforded too much weight to the specific intent
opportunity to redeem the collateral. National Bank of Illinois v. Baker, 128 Ill. 533,
21 N.E. 510 (1889); see also Rozet v. McClellan, 48 11. 345 (1868) (sale without

debtor's knowledge held invalid). See generally 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES

ON THE LAW

759, 583 (8th ed. 1873) (describes the common law roots of secured transactions law).
Under pre-Code statutory law, such as the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, the
notice requirement was also strictly enforced. United Securities Corp. v. Tomlin, 57
Del. 219, 198 A.2d 179 (1964); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Swiderski, 57 Del. 76, 195
A.2d 546, reh'g denied, 196 A.2d 214 (1963); Frantz Equip. Co. v. Anderson, 37 N.J.
Super. 420, 181 A.2d 499 (1962). See Henszey, A Secured Creditor's Right to Collect
a Deficiency Judgment under UCC Section 9-504: A Need to Remedy the Impasse,
31 Bus. LAW. 2025, 2028 (1976) (discussion of the pre-U.C.C. statutory law and judicial treatment of notice provisions).
In Illinois, the law concerning chattel mortgages was codified prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95, §27 (1957) (repealed
laws 1981 p. 1012 eff. July 31, 1961). Under that statutory scheme, notice was a
mandatory prerequisite to a deficiency judgment. W.H. Collins Ice Cream Co. v. Talmage, 210 Ill. App. 374 (1918).
36. Joannides, 103 Il. 2d at 299, 469 N.E.2d at 182. The court fails to recognize
as well, however, that the Code also lacks language expressly calling for a rebuttable
presumption. The absence of absolute bar language is no reason to adopt the rebuttable presumption theory, which is also absent from the Code.
37. Id. at 299-300, 469 N.E.2d at 182.
38. Instead of relying on the absence of absolute bar language, the court should
have relied on the absence of express language displacing the absolute bar theory. If
the court had correctly read pre-Code law into'the Code, it would not have rejected
the absolute bar theory. For a discussion of how pre-Code law fits into the Code, see
supra note 35 and accompanying text.
39. Section 1-102, the "general intent" provision, states that the underlying
purposes and policies of the Code are "(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law
governing commercial transactions; [and) (b) to permit the continued expansion of
commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties.
ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 26, §1-102(2)(a), (b) (1983).
40. Joannides, 103 Ill. 2d at 300, 469 N.E.2d at 182-83. For the complete text of
section 1-106, see supra note 27.
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provision and consequently failed to see that the rebuttable presumption theory contradicts the general intent provision.4 The rebuttable presumption theory neither simplifies and clarifies commercial law nor permits the continued expansion of commercial
practices through agreement of the parties. 4 2 On the contrary, it
both complicates commercial law and frustrates expansion of commercial practices. 43 If a secured party does not give notice to the
debtor before disposing of collateral, the debtor is deprived of the
opportunity to negotiate a possible settlement.44 The debtor is also
deprived of his right and opportunity to redeem the collateral.4 5 A
41. While it is true that the provision of the Code should be construed in a
manner that avoids penal results, McGrady v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 46 Ill. App. 3d
136, 360 N.E.2d 818 (1977), this goal must submit to the underlying purposes and
goals of the Code. Servbest Foods, Inc. v. Emessee Industries, Inc., 82 Ill. App. 3d
662, 403 N.E.2d 1 (1980). In Servbest, the court stated that the general purpose of the
Code is to establish a practical working tool for parties involved in commercial practices. Id. at 671, 403 N.E.2d at 8. Even if the rebuttable presumption theory removes
the possibility that the secured party may be denied a deficiency when the debtor has
suffered no damage, the Joannides court failed to see that the rebuttable presumption theory contradicts the general purpose of the Code. For an analysis of the rebuttable presumption theory and examples of how that theory contradicts the general
intent of the Code, see infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 45-57 and accompanying text (guarantors are less likely to
aid debtors if collateral may be sold without notice, thus frustrating agreement of the
parties).
43. See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (rebuttable presumption theory discourages guarantors from participating in secured transactions).
44. The ability of a debtor to negotiate with the secured party is important
when the purpose of the Code is examined. The Code calls for the "continued expansion of commercial practices through... agreement of the parties." ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
26, §1-102(2)(b) (1983). If a secured party sells the collateral without notifying the
debtor, the debtor never has an opportunity to negotiate or even discuss the situation
with the secured party. Allowing a secured party to dispose of collateral without notifying the debtor directly contradicts the policy which mandates that the parties
should work together.
45. The debtor's right to redeem is also closely related to the intent of the
Code. Redemption not only serves to promote maximum participation between the
parties but also simplifies and clarifies secured transactions. When a debtor successfully obtains sufficient capital to redeem, the need for a sale and possibly litigation
are eliminated. Disallowing the right to redemption effectively opens the door to complicated default sales and possible litigation. In addition, it is important to note that
the notice requirement was instituted at common law to allow the debtor an opportunity to redeem collateral. National Bank of Illinois v. Baker, 128 Ill. 533, 21 N.E. 510
(1889); Tucker v. Wilson, 24 Eng. Rep. 379, 1 P. Wins. 261 (1714). For a discussion of
the common law roots of secured transactions law, see supra note 35 and accompanying text. Section 9-506, which sets forth the debtor's right to redeem, provides:
At any time before the secured party has disposed of collateral or entered
into a contract for its disposition under Section 9-504. . .the debtor or any
other secured party may. . .redeem the collateral by tendering fulfillment of
all obligations secured by the collateral as well as the expenses reasonably incurred by the secured party in retaking, holding and preparing the collateral
for disposition, in arranging for the sale, and to the extent provided in the
agreement and not prohibited by law, his reasonable attorneys' fees and legal
expenses.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, §9-506 (1983).
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guarantor must now constantly check the status of collateral to insure that it is not sold without his knowledge,4 and persons in a
position to become guarantors in secured transactions are less likely
to do so when the collateral may be sold without prior notice. 7 Consequently, the rebuttable presumption theory complicates the
mechanics of a secured transaction and discourages agreement of
8
the parties.'
In relying on the specific intent provision, the Joannides court
also violated an accepted rule of statutory interpretation. It is a generally accepted principle that the general provisions of a statute
must not be interpreted in a manner that negates the specific provisions. 4' The court nevertheless relied on an intent provision to the
extent that it negated the notice and redemption provisions.5 0 Under
the rebuttable presumption theory, a secured party is not required
to notify the debtor of post-default sales of collateral in order to
46. Guarantors must be given notice when a secured party disposes of collateral.
See supra note 13 (discusses parties to whom notice must be given). A guarantor is
also a party most likely to redeem collateral, and notification of the sale will promote
maximum participation by the guarantor. Notification of the sale will simplify and
clarify the secured transaction. See supra note 45 (discusses the debtor's right to
redeem collateral). In short, notice to a guarantor may solve the entire problem, as a
guarantor is likely to have capital sufficient to redeem the collateral.
47. A prospective guarantor may decline to enter into the secured transaction
for two reasons. First, the guarantor may be hesitant because he knows that the collateral may be disposed of without notice. Second, the guarantor may be held liable
for the guaranteed amount even if the debtor is absolved of liability. See, e.g., Investors Acceptance Co. of Livingston v. James Talcott, Inc., 61 Tenn. App. 307, 454
S.W.2d 130 (1969). In Investors, the court stated that a guarantor may be held liable
even when the secured party wrongfully terminates the contract. Id. at -,
454
S.W.2d at 136. This was true because, in that case, the secured party had an "unlimited" contractual right to demand the guaranty amount. Id. It follows that a prospective guarantor will be careful of entering into a secured transaction.
48. While it is true that the debtor in the Joannides decision probably did not
deserve the protection of the absolute bar theory (see supra note 10), the average
debtor is not a criminal. For instance, some debtors voluntarily return collateral upon
default and attempt to cooperate with the secured party. See, e.g., Hemken v. First
Nat'l Bank of Litchfield, 76 Ill. App. 3d 23, 394 N.E.2d 868 (1979). In Hemken, the
debtor voluntarily returned the collateral and subsequently requested an opportunity
to redeem the collateral. Id. at 25, 394 N.E.2d at 870. The secured party sold the
collateral without notifying the debtor and rebuffed the debtor's effort to redeem the
collateral. Id. The rebuttable presumption theory is not fair to good faith debtors
because it allows secured parties to manipulate collateral in any manner.
49. See, e.g., Harrell v. Board of Trustees of S. Ill. Univ., 48 Ill. App. 3d 319,
321, 362 N.E.2d 441, 444 (1977); Johnson v. Town of Evanston, 39 Ill. App. 3d 419,
426, 350 N.E.2d 70, 76 (1976); Dianis v. Waenke, 29 Ill. App. 3d 133, 142, 330 N.E.2d
302, 310 (1975). See also Hemken v. First Nat'l Bank of Litchfield, 76 Ill. App. 3d 23,
394 N.E.2d 868 (1979). In Hemken, the secured party sold collateral without notifying
the debtor, even though the debtor made several efforts to redeem the collateral. Id.
at 25, 394 N.E.2d at 870. If the debtor had known of the time and place of the sale,
he could have redeemed the collateral then and there. Without notice, however, the
debtor was unable to redeem the collateral. Id.
50. See infra note 51-54 and accompanying text (discusses the rebuttable presumption theory's frustration of the debtor's right to redeem collateral).
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obtain a deficiency judgment. 1 A secured party may evaluate the
repossessed collateral and determine whether notice is desired. 2 If a
debtor is not notified of an impending sale and is unaware of the
status of the collateral, it becomes extremely difficult for the debtor
to exercise his right of- redemption." The rebuttable presumption
theory, therefore, essentially nullifies the notice and redemption
54
provisions.
The court's treatment of the notice provision not only disregards pre-Code law and erroneously relies on the specific intent provision but also neglects to examine the judicial treatment of other
Code requirements. For example, a secured party must file a financing statement in order to perfect a security interest in collateral .5
Filing of a financing statement is a condition precedent to a secured
party's right to priority over non-secured creditors. 6 The purpose of
the financing statement is to notify the debtor's prospective credi57
tors of the existence of an encumbrance on the collateral.
The notice requirement for a post-default sale of collateral
serves a similar purpose. The notice requirement enables the debtor
to attend the sale and allows the debtor to directly view the propriety of the sale. 8 In addition, the notice requirement allows the
51. As stated in Joannides, the secured party does not need to give notice in
order to obtain a deficiency judgment. Joannides,103 Ill. 2d at 300-01, 469 N.E.2d at
182-83. Instead, the secured party need only show that the sale was both commercially reasonable and that the value of the collateral was less than the value of the
indebtedness. Id.
52. If repossessed collateral appears to be worth more than the value of the
indebtedness, the secured party may end up with a surplus. If the debtor is unaware
of the sale he may never be credited with the surplus. Therefore, in addition to removing the longstanding notice requirement, the rebuttable presumption theory
opens the door to abuses which are not present with the absolute bar theory.
53. See supra note 49 (discusses the debtor's traditional right to redeem
collateral).
54. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (discussing the court's implicit negation of the debtor's redemption provision).
55. The perfection of a security interest is the process by which the secured
party notifies "the world" that some property of the debtor is encumbered. This is
accomplished through the filing of a financing statement. Interstate Steel Co. v.
Ramm Mfg. Co., 108 Ill. App. 3d 404, 438 N.E.2d 1381 (1982).
56. Section 9-302(1) of the Code states that "a financing statement must be
filed to perfect all security interests ..
" ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, §9-302(1) (1981).
Illinois case law mandates that a financing statement be filed in order to perfect a
security interest. First Bank & Trust Co. v. Post, 10 Ill. App. 3d 127, 293 N.E.2d 907
(1973); Bank of Broadway v. Goldblatt, 103 Ill. App. 2d 243, 243 N.E.2d 501 (1968).
57. This prevents the debtor from obtaining multiple loans using the same
chattel as collateral. Prospective creditors need only check financing statement
records to determine whether the property is encumbered. Bramble Transp. v. Sam
Senter Sales, Inc., 294 A.2d 97, 103 (Del. Super. 1971), aff'd, 294 A.2d 104 (1972). See
supra note 55.
58. See supra note 35. The debtor's presence at the sale may be extremely im-'
portant. For instance, if the sale is by public auction the debtor may participate in
the bidding and cause the sale price to be higher. Spillers v. First Nat'l Bank, 81 Ill.
App. 3d 199, 202, 400 N.E.2d 1057, 1060 (1980); Stensel v. Stensel, 63 Ill. App. 3d 639,
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debtor to exercise his right of redemption. 9 The purpose of requiring that a financing statement be filed as a condition precedent to
priority over other creditors is similar to that of the notice and redemption provisions, and therefore the Joannides court should have
strictly enforced the notice requirement.
The court adopted the rebuttable presumption theory, yet the
theory is not consonate with the realities of the secured transaction
setting. The rebuttable presumption theory is not fair to good faith
debtors because it allows secured parties to manipulate collateral in
any manner.6 0 If repossessed collateral appears to be worth more
than the value of the indebtedness, the secured party may decide
not to notify the debtor of the sale and wrongfully retain any surplus."1 The debtor, unaware of the sale, has no means by which to
ascertain whether a surplus was obtained at the sale. 2 Thus, the
rebuttable presumption theory may result in abuse of debtors' rights
in possible surpluses from repossession sales.
The absolute bar theory is more complimentary with the realities of a typical secured transaction. The absolute bar theory both
simplifies and clarifies secured transactions and promotes maximum
participation between the parties.6 " Under the absolute bar theory,
secured parties know that notice is a condition precedent to a deficiency judgment, and they will therefore comply with the notice provision.64 Receipt of notice enables debtors to exercise their post-default right of redemption. 5 Debtors may attend the sale and
643, 380 N.E.2d 526, 529 (1978). It is also appropriate to note that the debtor has a
right to view the sale. The secret disposition of collateral was one of the problems the
common law and statutory law sought to prevent. See Skeels v. Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696, 702 (W.D. Pa. 1963) (discusses the common law reasoning for the notice provision).
59. See supra note 35 (discusses the debtor's common law right to attend the
sale and redeem the collateral).
60. See supra note 48 (discusses the ability of the secured party to manipulate
collateral and wrongfully retain any surplus).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (the general intent of the code
calls for maximum participation of all parties).
64. The burden on the creditor to notify the debtor is not cumbersome. In fact,
the potential damage to the debtor from lack of notice far outweighs the burden on
the secured party to notify the debtor. As the Supreme Court of Delaware stated:
The burdens placed on the creditor under the Code are minimal, while the
results of his noncompliance may be very onerous to the debtor .... We are
unable to see any unfairness in protecting the debtor's rights to the exclusion
of those of the creditor when the creditor has been placed in such a high degree of control of the relationship and carries such a small burden in order to
gain the advantages of the Statute.
Wilmington Trust Co. v. Conner, 415 A.2d 773, 780 (Del. Supr. 1980).
65. See supra note 35 (discusses the debtor's common law right to redeem collateral prior to a repossession sale).
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enhance the sale price by participating in the bidding,"6 or they may
negotiate a settlement with the secured party. 7 In short, the absolute bar theory clarifies the secured transaction and simplifies the
relationship between the parties because the debtor is constantly
aware of the status of collateral.
The absolute bar theory also inhibits the secured party's ability
to manipulate repossessed collateral. If a debtor is notified of a sale
of repossessed collateral, the likelihood that he will be deprived of a
surplus is lessened.6 8 More importantly, however, the burdens
placed on the secured party to notify the debtor of post-default sales
are greatly outweighed by the onerous consequences which may flow
if a debtor is not notified of the sale. 9 It is not unduly burdensome
to require notice, especially when the secured party enjoys such a
high degree of control over the relationship. Consequently, the rebuttable presumption theory grants the secured party an unfair advantage in a relationship in which it already enjoys a high degree of
control.7 0
In summary, the court's reliance on the absence of absolute bar
language in the Code and its reliance on the debtor's rights and remedies provision does not justify adoption of the rebuttable presumption theory.7 1 Pre-Code law, which is subsumed into the code, mandates strict enforcement of the notice provision.7 In addition, the
court's analysis of the U.C.C. essentially negates the notice and redemption provisions.7 3 The court's treatment of the notice provision
falls far short of the strict judicial treatment of other code provi74
sions, such as the financing statement provision.
66. See supra note 58 (debtor may bid in the auction and otherwise view the
propriety of the sale).
67. In commercial transactions, the debtor sometimes uses loans and secured
transactions to expand a going concern. Unfortunately, however, the debtor's attempts at expanding a business often ends with frustration and lack of capital. When
that occurs, the secured party may either repossess the collateral or negotiate a settlement with the debtor. See, e.g., Hoch v. Ellis, 627 P.2d 1060 (Alaska 1981) (the secured party allowed the debtor a chance to obtain sufficient capital to continue the
business, but the business subsequently failed).
68. See supra notes 48, 60-62 (discusses the potential abuses open to the secured party to withhold notice and consequently retain any surplus).
69. See supra note 61 (there exists no apparent unfairness in placing the burden of notice on the secured party, especially since it already enjoys a high degree of
control).
70. Id.
71. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text (the court relied on the absence of absolute bar language but failed to find support for the rebuttable presumption theory either).
72. See supra note 35 (the Code subsumes pre-Code law, and notice is a condition precedent to a deficiency judgment under pre-Code law).
73. See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text (the court's reading of the
statute essentially denies the debtor his right to redeem).
74. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text (the notice to debtors is just
as important as creditor priority, and thus, the notice provision should be enforced).
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On a practical level, the rebuttable presumption theory frustrates the debtor's right to redeem, deprives the debtor of an opportunity to negotiate a settlement with the secured party, discourages
prospective guarantors from aiding debtors,7 5 and restrains a
debtor's ability to frustrate deceptive manipulation of collateral.71
The absolute bar theory, on the other hand, upholds the debtor's
right to notice, gives effect to all the Code's provisions, simplifies
and clarifies secured transactions, and promotes maximum partici77
pation of the parties.
Although the Joannides court resolved the Illinois conflict concerning the notice issue, analysis of the rebuttable presumption theory reveals that the debtor's position is significantly weakened. The
rebuttable presumption theory unjustifiably strengthens the secured
creditor's position, while at the same time it diminishes the debtor's
traditional rights. The Joannides court's grant of power allowing the
secured party to manipulate the collateral and its parallel deprivation of debtor rights constitutes an unreasonable construction of a
clearly worded statute. An equitable application of section 9-504 requires incorporation of the absolute bar rule into Illinois law.
Donald Q. Manning

75. See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text (guarantors are less likely to
aid debtors if collateral may be sold without notice).
76. See supra notes 60-62 (under the rebuttable presumption theory, the secured creditor may choose not to give notice and retain any surplus).
77. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text (the absolute bar theory
forces secured creditors to give notice, and allows the debtor to fully participate by
possibly redeeming the collateral).

